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Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt advocate the use of an “inequity aversion” utility function in 
game theoretic modeling as a means of explaining and predicting experimental data that 
money-maximizing models fail to accommodate. In response to their work, two prominent 
critical papers have been put forth: Shaked (2005) and Binmore and Shaked (2010). This paper 
aims to explicate and evaluate the criticisms leveled against Fehr and Schmidt in the second 
paper. 
 
First, I describe the theory of inequity aversion: how it is formalized, calibrated, and tested. 
Furthermore, I will identify exactly what data Fehr and Schmidt are seeking to explain in 
proposing the theory and how they think that their model outperforms the available 
alternatives. Then, I discuss a few thematic criticisms. One concerns the communicative tactics 
that Fehr and Schmidt use to mask deficiencies of their theory. Another question is whether 
their theory is predictively successful in the first place—especially with regard to the four 
games that Fehr and Schmidt consider. Finally, Binmore and Shaked (2010) allege that Fehr and 
Schmidt use different parametric distributions to fit the data, a tactic that resists falsification. 
In adjudicating these criticisms, I consider the responses given in Fehr and Schmidt (2010). To 
conclude, I discuss how these criticisms weigh on the credibility of Fehr and Schmidt’s model. 
 
The Inequity Aversion Model: An Overview 
 
Fehr and Schmidt declare that their intention in proposing the theory of inequity aversion was 
to answer the following question: why do subjects act selfishly in some games but generously 
and fairly in others? The simple theory that they settled on was one that they found to be “a 
tractable tool in more complicated models and that yields quantitative, testable predictions” (p 
101). 
 
To clarify the need for an alternative to the standard money-maximizing model, Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999, pp 817-818) point to a few experimental findings. A number of bilateral 
bargaining experiments seem to indicate that not all subjects are purely money-maximizers 
and in fact value fairness (Güth, Schmittberger, and Tietz 1990; Roth 1995; Camerer and Thaler 
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1995). In other contexts, however, it seems that fairness considerations are not particularly 
salient (Smith and Williams, 1990; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir, 1991; 
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, 1997). By Fehr and Schmidt’s 
assessment, traditional money-maximizing models do not explain these varied findings well, so 
they apply the assumption that a fraction of people are motivated by fairness—modeled as self-
centered inequity aversion. This assumption is formalized according to the following utility 
function: 𝑈! 𝑥 = 𝑥! − 𝛼!𝑛 − 1 𝑥! − 𝑥! !!!! − 𝛽!𝑛 − 1 𝑥! − 𝑥! !!!!  
where 0 ≤ 𝛽! < 1, 𝛽! ≤ 𝛼! and 𝑥! = max {𝑥, 0}. The parameter 𝛼 represents the strength of one’s 
aversion to others receiving more than oneself, and 𝛽 is the strength of one’s aversion to 
receiving more than others. Because the signs of the last two terms are negative, greater values 
of 𝛼 and 𝛽 are associated with utility reductions stemming from inequities. 
 
The inequity aversion theory’s prima facie domain of application extends to all games with 
more than one player. Fehr and Schmidt place no apparent constraint on where their theory 
should be applied besides this self-evident multi-subject requirement. However, Binmore and 
Shaked (2010, p 91) rightly point out that context bears heavily on what people count as fair. 
Two specific factors affecting these evaluations include “perceived need and prior investment 
of effort” (p 91). These contextual factors place an implicit constraint on the theory’s domain of 
application; insofar as assessments of fairness are not straightforward, it is unclear how Fehr 
and Schmidt’s utility function can be applied. Thus, Binmore and Shaked (2010) restrict their 
attention to the applications that Fehr and Schmidt propose with apparent success. 
 
Another question concerns how the theory is applied given Fehr and Schmidt’s assumption that 
people vary in their degrees of inequity aversion. In other words, the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
heterogenous across a population. Note that predictions can only be derived from the inequity 
aversion model if the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 are known. But, every experiment or situation 
potentially involves a different sample, and there is no value of 𝛼 and 𝛽 that is universally held. 
The most straightforward solution would be to identify a marginal and joint distribution of 𝛼 
and 𝛽, and one can assume that each experimental sample is representative of the population 
distribution. Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003) do exactly this using experimental data from the 
ultimatum game, defined in the forthcoming section. Binmore and Shaked (2010, p 92) 
question whether Fehr and Schmidt keep these distributions constant when predicting data in 
future experiments, a criticism that I shall return to in Section III. 
 
Finally, to apprehend the stakes of these criticisms, one should note the popularity of the 
inequity aversion model. The landmark QJE paper by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has been cited 
11,396 times according to Google Scholar—a six-fold increase since 2010. Binmore and Shaked 
(2010, p 90) examine the breakdown of these papers and find that few question the empirical 
adequacy of inequity aversion or its appropriate range of application. Most cite their work as an 
established development in the field of behavioral economics. Some even consider the model 
important enough to be worth teaching to undergraduates (Wilkinson, 2008). It must either be 
the case that Binmore and Shaked’s criticisms have been overlooked by the academic 
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community or have been duly assessed as unproblematic. I consider the latter case to be 
unlikely. 
 
Games, Experimental Designs, and Other Terms 
 
In the forthcoming sections, I will discuss and allude to four different types of games to which 
Fehr and Schmidt apply their model: the ultimatum game, the public goods game, auction 
games, and bonus contract games. 
 
The ultimatum game involves two parties, anonymous to one another. The proposer, endowed 
with a sum of money, proposes a certain division to a responder, who may either accept or veto 
the deal. If the responder accepts, the two players receive money as per the agreed upon 
division. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player receives money. Interestingly, a 
breadth of experimental data has shown that responders in a one-shot game consistently reject 
low offers and prefer receiving nothing to a disproportionately small monetary gain. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) point to this finding as a phenomenon that the inequity aversion model helps 
to explain; fairness and reciprocity appear to be salient concerns for ultimatum game subjects. 
Otherwise, Fehr and Schmidt argue, all gainful offers would be accepted. 
 
In the public goods game, subjects are allotted individual budgets. From these, subjects can 
secretly make donations to be put into a shared pot, which is multiplied at each stage by a 
growth factor and divided evenly between players. Subjects may retain the resources that they 
do not donate. Players who opt not to donate but receive a share of the pot are referred to as 
“free riders”. “Cooperators”, on the other hand, contribute an average or above average amount 
to the shared pot. There are a few design specifications that may influence experimental 
results. First, subjects may be given the option to punish free riders by eliminating their 
payoffs. This specification is referred to as the public goods game with punishment. Note that 
in the experiments studied by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) punishment is costly for those who 
punish. Public goods games can either proceed in multiple stages or in one. When the same 
subjects play the public goods game for a series of rounds, this is referred to as an iterated 
public goods game or a partner design. When subjects only interact with one another for one 
round, this is referred to as a one-shot public goods game or a stranger design. The stranger 
design is the standard experimental technique because the partner design introduces the 
variable of shared experience, which complicates how data is to be interpreted. As I will 
discuss, Fehr and Schmidt interestingly opt to use the partner design. In any case, they consider 
the public goods game to be a crucial test of the theory, as they assert that experimental 
findings diverge from the predictions of the money-maximizing model. Thus, Fehr and Schmidt 
argue, their theory may better explain the data. 
 
There are two varieties of auction or market games that Fehr and Schmidt consider. The first is 
an auction game with proposer competition, which proceeds as follows. Multiple proposers are 
each afforded a sum of money. All proposers offer a share of their budget to a single responder, 
who will accept or reject the highest offer. If a proposer’s offer is rejected, neither does the 
responder receive any money nor may the proposer keep any of his/her initial funds. If one 
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proposer makes the highest bid and if the bid is accepted, the money is divided accordingly. If 
multiple proposers are tied for the highest accepted bid, one is randomly chosen to divide 
his/her budget with the responder. The second kind of auction game that Fehr and Schmidt 
examine involves responder competition. This scenario involves a single proposer making a 
uniform offer to many responders. Among accepting responders, one is chosen at random to 
divide the budget with the proposer. Fehr and Schmidt admit that the money-maximizing 
model performs well with market games. Their aim in examining it is only to show that the 
inequity aversion model performs equally well.  
 
In a number of papers, Fehr and Schmidt different kinds of contract games. For the purposes of 
this paper, I focus on bonus contract games. The experiments in question involve principals 
giving contracts to an agent. The principal stipulates a wage, an effort level, and a bonus. 
Neither the agent’s effort nor the bonus are contractually enforceable. At a final stage, the 
principal chooses whether or not to award the bonus. Fehr and Schmidt (2005) point to the data 
generated from bonus contract experiments as consistent with the aggregate predictions of the 
inequity aversion model. One reason Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) think it important to 
examine bonus contracts is that these contracts contain an implicit fairness clause; if agents 
expend a satisfactory amount of effort, it is fair that a bonus would be awarded. Thus, subjects’ 
behavior in stipulating and awarding bonus contracts is perhaps a crucial test of the inequity 
aversion model. 
 
Favorable Selection: A Matter of Academic Integrity 
 
The first major charge leveled against Fehr and Schmidt is that they fail to disclose a number of 
tactics that portray their theory more favorably. The problematic tactics in question are 
examples of what Binmore and Shaked (2010) refer to as “favorable selection”. I consider three 
cases. First, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) count auction games as a predictive success when many 
other models can predict the same events with equivalent success. Second, for the public goods 
game without punishment, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) opt for the partner design rather than the 
standard stranger design, which produces starkly different outcomes than what the inequity 
aversion model would predict. In addition, they favorably select the rival theory against which 
they evaluate their own model’s performance. Third, in analyzing bonus contract games (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2004; Fehr et al, 2005; Fehr et al, 2007), Fehr and Schmidt selectively ignore the 
many failed predictions antecedent to the averages they find to be in line with their model’s 
predictions. I shall discuss each of these criticisms in turn and assess their veracity. 
 
If data from some experiment is predicted successfully by a wide range of rival theories, the 
same data cannot serve as a challenging test of the adequacy of a new theory, as the events in 
question are easy to predict. But, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) seem to commit this exact folly by 
using their model to predict auction games with proposer and responder competition—games 
that many other models predict with apparent success. Interestingly, under both game 
specifications, even when traders are assumed to have “zero-intelligence”, or bid at random 
subject to a budget constraint, predicted outcomes are largely in line with empirical data 
(Binmore and Shaked, 2010, p 95; Gode and Sunder, 1995).  
Revisiting the Criticisms of Binmore and Shaked 
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For the auction game with proposer competition, Fehr and Schmidt’s model successfully 
predicts that experienced proposers will offer all surplus to responders. However, they make a 
mistake in experimental design by failing to allow responders to choose an equitable offer over 
the highest offer (Binmore and Shaked, 2010, p 95). Had they allowed for this choice, their 
theory could have been crucially tested—confirmed or disconfirmed. Instead, what they found 
tells us very little beyond that their model can predict outcomes that are just as easily predicted 
by other models. For the auction game with responder competition, the inequity aversion 
model, consistent with observed data, predicts that experienced responders will accept very low 
offers. Again, the money-maximizing model generates the same prediction. For these reasons, 
as Binmore and Shaked (2010) declare, this easily predictable game offers little in the way of 
supporting the inequity aversion theory, and Fehr and Schmidt’s decision to feature it in 
defense of their model is puzzling and perhaps somewhat deceptive. 
 
A second example of favorable selection lies in Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) decision to examine 
the public goods game without punishment under the partner design specification rather than 
the stranger design. Subjects tend to play more cooperatively under the partner design, a factor 
that would inflate the empirical adequacy of an inequity aversion model relative to the stranger 
design. Because of the dubious empirical adequacy of backward induction, standard practice is 
to examine one-shot games using the stranger design, which makes it even more peculiar that 
Fehr and Schmidt would opt for the partner design. Binmore and Shaked (2010, p 93) show that 
had Fehr and Schmidt examined data from different specifications of the game, their model 
would have performed substantially worse than it did. Moreover, they do not compare their 
predictions with the no-punishment experimental data that appears in Fehr and Gächter (2000) 
despite citing data from this paper when examining the game with punishment. As Binmore 
and Shaked (2010, p 94) note, had they used the numbers from Fehr and Gächter (2000), they 
would have found an even larger discrepancy between the prediction and data than they did—
an indication that the model fails to predict the behavior of nearly 49% of subjects. 
 
When analyzing the public goods game with punishment, Fehr and Schmidt also opt for the 
partner design. For this variation of the public goods game, it may be argued that the inequity 
aversion model predicts better than does the money-maximizing model. However, Binmore and 
Shaked point out three different kinds of favorable selection that Fehr and Schmidt employ in 
making this claim. First, their model’s prediction is more accurate under the partner design 
specification, wherein rates of maximum contribution are 80%, than under the stranger design 
specification, wherein only 10% contribute the maximum. Binmore and Shaked note that it is 
unnecessary for Fehr and Schmidt to use the unconventional partner design, as even the 10% 
maximum contribution rate of the stranger design is sufficient to challenge the supposedly 
unique money-maximizing prediction that all subjects will free ride. About this instance of 
favorable selection, Fehr and Schmidt (2010) say nothing other than to assert that the lower 
contribution rates of a stranger design would not be inconsistent with their model, which 
allows for a range of equilibria. However, if any level of contribution can be defended as a 
prediction of the model, it makes little sense to claim that their model meaningfully or 
uniquely predicts the data observed under the partner design; their model does not predictively 
favor the observed equilibrium more than it does any other equilibrium.  
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Moreover, Fehr and Schmidt favorably select the variation of the money-maximizing model 
against which they compare their model’s performance. For example, money-maximizing 
models that attribute irrational behavior to a small fraction of the population generate 
different predictions than what Fehr and Schmidt (1999) regard as the unique money-
maximizing prediction (Binmore and Shaked, 2010, p 94; Kreps et al, 1982). In fact, there are a 
range of Nash equilibria under the money-maximizing model including all players contributing 
the maximum. This is because even experienced players may have never learned to evaluate 
subgames that have never been reached. Consider the following example given by Binmore and 
Shaked (2010, p 95). Assume that every player at the outset intends to punish others who fail to 
contribute the maximum. Nobody deviates for fear of being punished, and, for this reason, 
nobody learns that punishing players who will never again be encountered is pointless. As such, 
all players contributing the maximum is a Nash equilibrium, and Fehr and Schmidt are 
therefore wrong to uniquely identify the money-maximizing model with the prediction that all 
players will free ride. In their reply to Binmore and Shaked (2010), Fehr and Schmidt (2010) 
offer no defense of this alleged instance of favorable selection. 
 
A final instance of favorable selection is evident in Fehr and Schmidt’s application of their 
model to bonus contract games. As previously discussed, the experiments in question involves 
a principal offering a contract (wage, effort level, and bonus) to an agent. The agent may decide 
how much effort to exert, and the principal may decide whether or not to award the bonus. Fehr 
and Schmidt claim to successfully predict the average wage offered by principals, average 
bonus awarded, and average effort level. Problematically for Fehr and Schmidt, Binmore and 
Shaked (2010) identify a number of failed predictions antecedent to these predicted averages. 
For instance, the 40-60 distribution that Fehr and Schmidt assume in order to obtain these 
averages are clearly inconsistent with the observed percentage of principals who exhibit 
inequity averse behavior. Moreover, the inequity aversion model would predict that the 
bonuses offered by inequity-averse principals would equalize payoffs of principals and agents, 
but the data clearly refutes this prediction. Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr et al (2005, 2007) 
ignore these disconfirming observations and conveniently focus instead on the averages. 
Unquestionably, this is an instance of favorable selection; their model fails to predict all 
granular empirical findings, of which the averages that their model predicts are derivative. 
When discussing the inequity aversion model’s predictive shortcomings, I further consider 
these contract games in the next section. 
 
Predictive Shortcomings of the Inequity Aversion Model 
 
Even when overlooking Fehr and Schmidt’s misleading communicative tactics, it appears that 
the inequity aversion model predicts quite poorly for the games Fehr and Schmidt claim as 
confirmation of their theory. Binmore and Shaked (2010) substantiate this claim for three kinds 
of games: public goods games without punishment (partner design), auctioning games, and 
bonus contract games. 
 
For public goods games without punishment, the inequity aversion model predicts that nearly 
98.48% of subjects will be free riders, but the data yields an average of 73%—a relative 
Revisiting the Criticisms of Binmore and Shaked 
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difference of 35%. Glossing over this considerable difference, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) say, 
“Thus, it seems fair to say that our model is consistent with the bulk of individual choices in 
this game” (p 845). Further, the money-maximizing model appears to issue a nearly identical 
prediction of 100% free riders. Assessing the predictive efficacy of the inequity aversion model 
requires a standard of comparison: how well the model performs relative to its alternatives. 
Given that the model hardly performs better with regard to this game than does the money-
maximizing model, it makes little sense to count this data as evidence for the theory. Fehr and 
Schmidt (2010) take a concessionary tone in their response; they emphasize that they claimed 
only to roughly approximate the choices of experimental subjects. Even if Fehr and Schmidt’s 
defense is true, Binmore and Shaked (2010) are correct to claim that the theory’s predictive 
shortcomings cast doubt on its adequacy for explanatory purposes. After all, a theory cannot be 
said to make sense of the data—as Fehr and Schmidt assert—if it entails outcomes that are 
empirically contradicted. I return later to a discussion of the related aims of prediction and 
explanation. 
 
As previously discussed, the same appears to be true for the auctioning games, as many 
alternative models predict the same outcomes; even if players bid at random subject to a 
budget constraint, predictions are consistent with experimental data (Gode and Sunder, 1995). 
Money-maximizing models, in particular, do very well with these games. Thus, auctioning 
games offer no predictive basis for preferring the inequity aversion model, and in a footnote, 
Fehr and Schmidt (2010) admit as much (p 102). 
 
Finally, the inequity aversion model fails to predict bonus contract games in a number of ways. 
Fehr and Schmidt assume for their predictive purposes that 40% of individuals are inequity 
averse. For the sample population in Fehr et al (2007), it seems that only 27% of principals are 
inequity averse. If Fehr and Schmidt were to use a 27-73 ratio of inequity averse individuals to 
money-maximizers, the theory predicts no cooperation between principals and agents, with 
money-maximizing agents choosing low effort levels and principals generally opting not to 
award bonuses—a far cry from what the 40-60 distribution predicts. The same appears to be 
true of the fraction of inequity-averse individuals observed in Fehr and Schmidt (2004); 15.7% 
of individuals exhibit behavior consistent with inequity aversion, and the 40-60 distribution 
would contradict the non-cooperative consequent. Even if Fehr and Schmidt successfully 
predict the average bonus, average initial offer, and average effort level, they fail to predict any 
of the decisions and distributions that these averages stem from—hence, the charge of 
favorable selection by Binmore and Shaked (2010). What this shows is that there must exist 
some rival theory that would accurately predict granular behavior as well as aggregate 
tendencies, and, as such, the data seems to disconfirm inequity aversion theory rather than 
supporting it. 
 
To understand the implications of these predictive deficiencies, a couple of questions must be 
explored. First, to what extent is behavioral game theory a predictive endeavor, an explanatory 
one, or both? With these aims in mind, why might one prefer the inequity aversion model to its 
alternatives? Finally, do the inequity aversion model’s predictive and explanatory features bear 
on its optimal domain of application? I explore each of these questions in turn. 
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On the explanatory account of game theory, one would regard game theory as accounting for 
the reasoning processes that motivate behavioral outcomes. The defense offered by Fehr and 
Schmidt (2010) seems to echo this claim. An explanatory conception of game theory asks why 
subjects act in certain ways. For Fehr and Schmidt, the salient question is why experimental 
data reveals that subjects sometimes act as if they are not pure money-maximizers and perhaps 
exhibit other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 2010, p 102-103). The inequity aversion 
model was put forth in an effort to explain this finding. It assumes that subjects act out an 
ingrained psychological preference for more equal outcomes. 
 
 A predictive account of game theory, on the other hand, focuses on mere strategic behavior, 
not reasoning. Why subjects act as they do is irrelevant (and often unknowable). All that is 
relevant is that how they act is consistent with what the model predicts. Whether Fehr and 
Schmidt’s work can be defended depends largely on how one understands the game theoretic 
task qua prediction or explanation. I examine how the inequity aversion model is assessed and 
applied in order to determine whether prediction or explanation is more fundamental. The 
inequity aversion model is useful for explanatory purposes if experimental data reveals subjects 
behaving as if they are averse to inequities. Whether or not inequities factor into a subject’s 
motivations is not observable from behavior alone. Thus, to the extent that behavior deviates 
from the model’s predictions, the motivations that the model attributes to subjects cannot 
suffice for explanatory purposes. Predictive deficiencies, therefore, weigh heavily against the 
explanatory virtues that Fehr and Schmidt claim in support of their theory. Second, one could 
question whether game theoretic modeling serves an explanatory purpose at all. Game theory 
seeks to model social behavior, not motivations.  
 
Hypotheses about motivations, however, may emerge as a byproduct of predictive successes 
and failures, and psychological studies may follow. Whether game theory plays an explanatory 
role is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that the predictive shortcomings of 
the inequity aversion model certainly cast doubt on its explanatory value. There are multiple 
reasons why one model might be preferable to another. A few include range of application or 
universality, ability to account for anomalous data, simplicity or elegance, and consistency with 
wider bodies of knowledge (psychological theory, for instance). 
 
A more universal theory can be applied to a wider range of situations than can a more 
provincial one. Accordingly, Fehr and Schmid (1999) claim that their theory “can be applied to 
any game” (p 856). However, as Binmore and Shaked (2010) point out, what subjects perceive as 
fair and the extent to which they value fairness depends on a number of contextual situations; 
people do not expect others to evenly split the contents of their wallets with strangers they 
pass on the street even if they may prefer to do so in an ultimatum game setup. On the other 
hand, the social norms approach appears to be more universally applicable relative to the 
inequity aversion model. Social norms are possibly present in all social contexts, and, once 
identified, subjects’ sensitivity to the norm can be measured empirically. A relevant 
consideration in assessing a theory’s proper domain of application is in which contexts it 
predicts better than rival theories. For the inequity aversion model to have substantial appeal, 
there must be a reasonable number of contexts in which it performs better than its alternatives. 
Revisiting the Criticisms of Binmore and Shaked 
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It seems, as per the predictive deficiencies highlighted by Binmore and Shaked (2010), that the 
model does not do so. 
 
Fehr and Schmidt claim as an advantage of their theory that it predicts experimental findings 
that money-maximizing models cannot account for—what one might call anomalous data, 
unassimilable by the dominant paradigm. The puzzle in question that Fehr and Schmidt claim 
to solve is why other-regarding preferences appear to be operative in some subjects and 
contexts but not in others. The favorable selection problem I discuss earlier impugns this claim, 
as much of the data that they claim as anomalous would in fact be accommodated by 
reasonable variations of the money-maximizing model. Moreover, the predictions that do 
appear more accurate are not unique predictions of the inequity aversion model; a number of 
less accurate predictions could be claimed as equilibria. Finally, as this section recounts, the 
model fails to predict several games that Fehr and Schmidt consider to be crucial tests of their 
theory. For these reasons, I conclude that the inequity aversion model does not deal with 
anomalous findings significantly better than do other models. 
 
Another purported virtue of the inequity aversion model is that it is simple and tractable. In 
other words, it assumes relatively little and can be applied to a variety of situations with few 
formal adjustments. Tractability is hardly an advantage of this theory over its major rivals—the 
social norms and money-maximizing paradigms. Each of these alternatives can be just as easily 
applied to different situations, and the social norms approach, in particular, offers the ability to 
directly measure the importance of a norm rather than calibrating a parameter using a different 
experimental situation, as in the case of the inequity aversion model. It is true that the inequity 
aversion model is simple, however, but, again, no simpler than its rivals. Both the social norms 
and money-maximizing approaches posit very little about subjects’ motivations. In fact, one 
could argue that the inequity aversion model assumes more by assuming from the outset that 
fairness considerations are present. The social norms approach, on the other hand, measures 
the importance of a norm rather than assuming it. Neither simplicity not tractability, it seems, 
are relative strengths of Fehr and Schmidt’s model. 
 
A model’s consistency with theory in other domains may also be claimed as an advantage over 
its rivals. If an empirically adequate model expresses certain synergies with successful theories 
in psychology, for instance, it may be preferable to models whose assumptions contradict those 
same theories. For instance, money-maximizing models fail to account for psychological 
motives that often yield non-money-maximizing outcomes. This theoretical virtue to some 
extent reflects the explanatory aims of theory, though the explanatory relevance of game 
theoretic models comes not from the model alone but from its ability to successfully predict 
using realistic assumptions. On this view, one must also hold that realism is a crucial feature of 
behavioral models. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) claim this advantage for their theory and say 
explicitly, “Our theory is motivated by the psychological evidence on social comparison and 
loss aversion” (p 856). Insofar as the psychology they appeal to seems conclusive, this is a 
virtue of the inequity aversion model. However, Binmore and Shaked (2010) prefer the social 
norms approach on the grounds that subjects’ other-regarding preferences are context-
dependent. Thus, the psychological theories that Fehr and Schmidt apply are only conditionally 
applicable, and, in behavioral experiments, one can never know a priori which conscious or 
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subconscious motives are operative. A social norms approach perhaps better account for these 
contextual considerations that are only measurable empirically, a posteriori. The inequity 
aversion model, therefore, while formalizing established psychological motives, does not do so 
in a manner that is comprehensive and is not justified in its generalizing assumption. 
 
Methodological Concerns: Setting Parameters  
 
Fehr and Schmidt’s use of parameters poses an additional methodological concern. In assessing 
a theory, it is necessary to compare forecasts to data, and the inequity aversion model is 
formalized such that parameters must be set before forecasts can be produced. Much of the 
forecasting successes that Fehr and Schmidt tout in defense their theory rely on a parametric 
distribution abstracted from ultimatum game experimental data. Binmore and Shaked (2010) 
allege that Fehr and Schmidt use floating parameters; they revise the distributions they use 
according to the data that they wish to predict. 
 
Binmore and Shaked focus on a few specific cases of Fehr and Schmidt deviating from their 
“calibrated” distributions. The calibration they settle upon in their Quarterly Journal of 
Economics paper (1999) is as follows: 
 
 
The four types of individuals are shown in the rightmost table. Each joint distribution 
corresponds to a different degree of inequity aversion. While Fehr and Schmidt (1999) make 
clear that these distributions reflect their ultimatum game data, it is less clear exactly how they 
do so. For instance, as Binmore and Shaked (2010, p 92) note, no data is given pertaining to the 
joint distribution of 𝛼 and 𝛽. This observation suggests that the parameters are under-
identified and may float to a considerable degree. The fact that these parameters can float is 
evidenced in Fehr and Schmidt’s analysis of three contract games (Binmore and Shaked, 2010, 
pp 96-98). Three papers exhibit an altered distribution from the one declared in the QJE paper 
(1999): one on bonus, trust and incentive contracts (Fehr at al, 2007); another on joint 
ownership contracts (Fehr et al, 2005); and a final one on piecewise and bonus contracts (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2004). In each, Fehr and Schmidt use a 40-60 distribution, wherein 40% of 
subjects are inequity averse (𝛼 = 2 and 𝛽 = 0.6) and 60% of subjects are money-maximizers, with 𝛼 and 𝛽 values of zero. This distribution treats as money-maximizers the 30% of subjects in the 
QJE joint distribution for whom 𝛼 = 0.5 and 𝛽 = 0.25. Binmore and Shaked (2010, p 97) correctly 
note that this distributional difference is meaningful; subjects with mild inequity aversion are 
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not behaviorally identical to pure money-maximizers. Thus, it seems that the choice to deviate 
from the QJE distribution must be justified. 
 
Fehr and Schmidt (2010, p 105) defend this decision by arguing that the 40-60 distribution is a 
simplification of the distribution used in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as it would be too tedious 
and inelegant to consider four types of individuals in their analyses of contract games. As 
previously noted, calling the difference a mere simplification does not suffice; reclassifying 
mildly inequity averse subjects as money-maximizers changes what predictions follow. Fehr 
and Schmidt must independently justify the 40-60 distribution as one that yields valid 
predictions. 
 
Second, Fehr and Schmidt (2010, pp 103-104) argue that adherence to the original distribution 
is not necessary, as their three papers on contract games are not intended as tests of inequity 
aversion but as rough interpretative exercises—mere illustrations of how fairness models can 
make sense of contract game behavior. To apply the model as an interpretative exercise takes 
for granted the very thing that is in question: whether the model deserves explanatory 
consideration given its severe predictive shortcomings. A few questions follow. Would it not be 
more appropriate if their papers were intended as tests of the model? After all, the data being 
roughly interpreted should be predictable if inequity aversion were empirically successful—as 
Fehr and Schmidt must surely hope to demonstrate. Moreover, if their theory and its proper 
parametric distributions are too inelegant to be useful for this predictive task, should that not 
count against the usefulness of the theory? The four-type distribution should not be so tedious 
that the theory’s chief advocates and originators cannot use it for prediction.  
 
Third, Fehr and Schmidt (2010) note that their QJE distribution is not a unique one, so they do 
not disregard their ultimatum game findings in changing their distribution. Rather, the 
distribution they originally declare is merely suggested as one among many that are potentially 
consistent with the ultimatum game data. They acknowledge that “there are many degrees of 
freedom in choosing a distribution consistent with the ultimatum game” (p 104). This 
statement serves as explicit confirmation of Binmore and Shaked’s (2010) suggestion that their 
parameters are under-identified. Perhaps the 40-60 distribution is compatible with Fehr and 
Schmidt’s empirical findings, but there are serious problems with the flexibility they exploit in 
applying their model. In order to confirm or disconfirm a theory, one must be able to derive 
testable predictions from it, but if the parameters can vary considerably, so too can the 
consequent predictions. The model is therefore harder to falsify and easier to confirm, as it is 
consistent with a wide range of observations. Until the theory’s proponents are able to pin 
down parameters, perhaps using additional auxiliary assumptions, the model should not be 
treated as a viable (or testable) predictive tool, let alone an explanatory one. Even if some are 
motivated by sheer faith that their work on the model will be vindicated, scholars should adopt 
a critical lens when assessing Fehr and Schmidt’s work. Because Fehr and Schmidt enjoy 
substantial freedom in choosing parametric distributions, it is plausible that the distributions 
they have chosen yield more favorable predictions than do alternative distributions that are 
consistent with the ultimatum game. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) offer few reasons for preferring 
their distribution other than that it is consistent with the ultimatum game data—like many 
other distributions seem to be. Since Fehr and Schmidt insufficiently support the distributions 
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they choose, there is no reason to think that the predictions issued from these distributions 
constitute effective tests of the model’s credibility. 
 
A question then arises: what is a more appropriate method of calibrating a model? The inequity 
aversion model makes a particular assumption about what motivates people. However, these 
motivations are apt to vary in different contexts. As such, it is methodologically suspect that 
Fehr and Schmidt derive parametric distributions that fit ultimatum game data and use the 
same distribution in many other games. Moreover, the extent to which ultimatum game 
behavior is motivated by inequity aversion is a psychological consideration, unknowable 
through the lens of behavior without surveying social expectations and attitudes. As such, if 
the explanatory or predictive power of the fairness assumption is to be tested, Fehr and 
Schmidt ought to find a way to measure degrees of inequity aversion in each experimental 
context. Contrast this approach with that of social norms theory. Adherents to this paradigm 
survey experimental subjects to assess empirical expectations, normative expectations, and 
social expectations, which allow identification of the relevant norms (Bicchieri, 2006). Context- 
and subject-specific attitudes must be measured for a parametric distribution to be properly set 
and for the model’s assumptions to be crucially tested. 
 
Setting parameters in good faith requires consistency and transparency. Parametric 
distributions should be set using data and data alone—not set according to the subjective 
preferences of the authors. Fehr and Schmidt’s convenient use of a more elegant or simple 
distribution trades off with methodological integrity. To the extent that data alone does not 
dictate the distribution in the same way each time, the model’s predictions are indefinite. One 
way that Fehr and Schmidt may crucially test their theory is by sticking to (and defending) their 
assumption that ultimatum game data reflects a global population distribution of inequity 
averse attitudes. If predictions then fail, then either this assumption from which parameters 
are derived must be revised or the utility function itself must be. Alternatively, a different 
calibration method may be adopted like the one used by the social norms model: attitudinal 
surveys. Moreover, Fehr and Schmidt are not transparent about how and when they vary their 
distributions. As noted earlier, they do not show how their joint distribution is derived, nor do 
they fully explain their reasons for deviating from the ultimatum game distribution until their 
2010 response to Binmore and Shaked. For these reasons, I find that Fehr and Schmidt’s 




I have discussed three kinds of criticisms that Binmore and Shaked (2010) have leveled against 
Fehr and Schmidt: favorable selection, predictive inadequacy, and use of floating parameters. 
Each has weighty implications on how the inequity aversion model should be evaluated. Fehr 
and Schmidt favorably select events to predict, what to treat as the model’s prediction, and 
what rival theories to compare the model’s performance to. Insofar as they do so, the empirical 
adequacy of the model should remain in doubt, as the model’s handle on events that are even 
remotely challenging to predict has not been proven. Even for the mild predictive challenges 
that Fehr and Schmidt do undertake, their model performs unimpressively. In some cases, its 
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predictions are quite inaccurate. In others, the model performs no better than its alternatives—
namely, variants of the money-maximizing model. Finally, Fehr and Schmidt’s use of floating 
parameters raises doubts about the definiteness of their model’s forecasts. It is difficult to 
falsify a model whose predictions are a moving target. Moreover, because Fehr and Schmidt are 
those who set their parameters’ distributions, it is possible that they adjust their distributions 
in order to generate more favorable predictions. As Binmore and Shaked (2010) note, such a 
process would entail that Fehr and Schmidt are engaged in a fitting exercise as opposed to a 
predicting exercise (p 92). Before they can meaningfully test their theory, Fehr and Schmidt 
must offer fixed and detailed assumptions from which their parameters’ distributions can be 
precisely determined. In reviewing the responses given by Fehr and Schmidt, I find no 
satisfactory justifications for these serious methodological and empirical flaws, and, unless 
these issues have been remedied in their subsequent work, there seems little reason to assign 
credibility to their model. 
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